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I. Introduction
It is a central feature of all modern systems of criminal law that the
individual's liability to punishment, at least in the case of serious of-
fenses, is made conditional upon the absence of certain 'mental con-
ditions', taking this term in a wide sense. These conditions are often
conceptualized negatively as excuses or excusing conditions since they
serve to relieve the individual of liability even though it is acknowl-
edged that he engaged in some act condemned by tile law. Thus, as
a general matter, a man is not subject to punishment if at the time
of his offense he was, among other things, (i) mistaken about some
material fact regarding the circumstances he was in, (ii) unaware of
what the consequences of his acts would be, (iii) unconscious or in
a trance, (iv) unable to control his muscular movements (as, for ex-
ample, occurs in epilepsy), (v) insane, (vi) an infant or (vii) subject
to certain forms of coercion or duress. It is true, of course, that no legal
system recognizes all these excusing conditions (and others of a similar
character) in all cases and without qualification. Compromises are
struck, most often in cases where it is believed that extreme difficulties
of proof would otherwise result or where some overriding considera-
tion of public policy or public safety is present. Such compromises are
exemplified in our law, respectively, by conclusive 'evidentiary' pre-
sumptions such as "every sane man intends the natural and probable
consequences of his acts"' and by the mass of public welfare offenses
which has grown up over the last century as the result of legislation.2
* The author wishes to thank Mr. A. M. Quinton of New College, Oxford for his
great assistance in the preparation of an earlier version of this Note.
1. See, e.g., Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, [1961] A.C. 290. where such a
conclusive presumption was applied to a defendant charged with murder. The effect of
the presumption is, of course, to exclude the defense of "no intention' once certain facts
are proved. As Lord Kilnmuir put the point in Smith: "Once . . . the jury arc satisfied
[that the accused voluntarily engaged in an unlawful act directed at another person] it
matters not what the accused in fact contemplated as the probable result or whether he
ever contemplated at all .... [Tlhe sole question is whether the unlawful and voluntary
act was of such a kind that grievous bodily harn was the natural and probable result.
The only test available for this is what the ordinary . . . man would . . . have contem-
plated as the natural and probable result." Id. at 327 (emphasis added). After a prolonged
and heated national debate, the Smith Case was overrled by Parliament. See Criminal
Justice Act 1967, § 8.
2. These offenses-all of which involve strict liability-first appeared in Anglo-
American law slightly more than a hundred years ago. The designation 'public welfare'
derives from the fact that all of the early statutes defining such offenses were aimed at
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Nevertheless, the recognition of mental excusing conditions is the rule
rather than the exception in modern criminal law. And because it is
the rule, and also-perhaps exactly-because exceptions to it are re-
garded as 'compromises', the over-all practice of conditioning liability
on excuses is often construed as a reflection in the law of a quite gen-
eral principle of social life, namely: that a man is not responsible for
a wrong he has committed unless, in some way, his 'mind' or 'will'
can be implicated in the offense.
This principle of responsibility may best be explained by reference
to the following, somewhat Cartesian, figure. If a person is conceived
as an embodied mind or will, a distinction may be drawn between
two questions regarding the appraisal of his conduct. The first ques-
tion is: Has he, judged solely by his outward conduct, engaged in some
kind of wrongdoing or brought about some harmful result? The sec-
ond question is: How closely connected with such wrongdoing or harm
was his (embodied) mind or will?3 To what extent was he the author
of the wrong or harm involved? It is considerations bearing on this
second question which are in issue when the question of responsibility
is raised, and, as a general matter, such considerations become rele-
vant only after it is already established that a person has done some-
thing wrong.4 This principle of responsibility is represented in Anglo-
American criminal law by the doctrine of mens rea, a doctrine which
entered the common law several centuries ago via the Latin maxim:
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. This maxim has been rendered
into English as "an act does not make a person guilty unless the mind
is guilty."5 It is because this maxim is an integral part of our law that
courts in England and America regularly make inquiries into such
matters as the state of a defendant's knowledge at the time of his of-
fense, the capacity he possessed to control his muscular movement,
his sanity, etc. before deciding the issue of his liability to punishment.
And if it is found, for example, that a defendant did lack some material
bit of knowledge at the time of his unfortunate conduct or was un-
able to control his muscular movements or was insane, these facts will
practices posing a broad and serious threat to public safety or the public good, e.g., sale
of adulterated food, sale of narcotics, violation of building regulations, etc. See generally
J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 327-31 (2d cd. 1960) [hereinafter cited
as HALL].
3. H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESI'ONSIBILrITY 221 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
HART].
4. There are some exceptions to this rule. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanily
Delense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 864I (1963). where the authors point out that oil
retrial in the celebrated case of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir, 1954),
the issue of insanity was submitted to the jury before the issue of guilt or innocence.
5. R. CROSS & 1. A. JONES, AN INTRODUcrION TO CRIMINAL LAW 30 (5th ed. 1961)
[hereinafter cited as CROSS & JONES].
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generally be sufficient to ground a complete acquittal. In orthodox
legal parlance it is said that the 'subjective element' necessary for
liability has not been shown; or, more simply, that because some ex-
cusing condition was present, no mens rea existed."
Exactly why the law does, and ought to, refrain from applying its
sanctions to offenders who lack nens rea is a matter of some con-
troversy. Utilitarians of one kind or another have maintained since
the time of Bentham that such a practice is justified by its practical
effects measured against the standard of utility.- It is now a widely
held view among legal philosophers, however, that irrespective of the
injunctions of the utilitarian calculus, a justification may be made out
for the practice of requiring mens rea as a condition of criminal lia-
bility on the basis of ordinary, non-utilitarian, notions of justice and
fairness.8 Nor does this require a wholesale subscription to the views
of traditional 'retributivism'. The argument, in outline form, runs
as follows. Even if one agrees that the underlying justification of
criminal punishment is utilitarian in character, it does not follow
from this that there are no other (independent) values 'in play' in
the punishment situation. In fact, there is at least one such value,
fairness, and it serves, among other thing, to restrict the range of
subjects against whom the law may properly direct its sanctions. Thus,
even if it might be justified on utilitarian grounds, in some hypo-
thetical situation, to punish a man who has done nothing wrong, this
would be precluded by considerations of fairness." Similarly, the argu-
ment continues, it is unfair to punish a man who has done something
wrong if, at the time, he was laboring under a mistake and did not
know what he was doing, or could not control his bodily movements,
or for some other reason was totally devoid of mens rea. Although
these two situations are different in a number of important respects,
the moral protest in each is the same: the innocent must not be made
to suffer punishment.
It is this principle which underlies the miens rea requirement in
criminal law, and one need not look very far to uncover its roots.
Punishment, whether in a legal context or not, is a distinctive human
activity. It involves not only the infliction of suffering on an indi-
6. For express judicial recognition of 'insanity' as a mental condition which ncgatihes
mens rea or 'guilty mind', sec United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961).
7- J. BENTHAM, PRINCII'LES OF MORALS AND LE.ISLATIO.N, Ch. 13, Sec. 3 (IV. Harrison
ed. 1960).
8. See, e.g., HART 17-22 and 48-49.
9. Id. at 11-12. There are, of course, a small number of offenses of this kind recognized
in Anglo-American law. Crimes of 'vicarious liability' provide the most conspicuottus ex-
ample. See CROSS & JONES 96-98 and J. Smtrrit & B. HoGA'N, CRVINAL LAw 98-103 (2d ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as S'ttirt & HOAN].
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vidual, but also an extreme form of condemnation. It is typically in
situations such as this, i.e., situations in which harsh burdens are to
be distributed and/or individuals are to be held up to scorn, that
rules of restraint and just desert are developed by human society.
Such rules become embodied in the practices and speech of ordinary
life, and give rise to claims of one kind and another. Standards evolve.
Thus it is not every regrettable act that will bring down upon a man
the wrath of his fellows. Perhaps it was a mistake or an accident; or
perhaps the actor could not help himself. These discriminations are
deeply embedded in human attitudes. Nor is this particularly surpris.
ing. As a trenchant Mr. Justice Holmes once remarked, "even a dog
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked."'10
If it is now widely agreed that criminal punishment requires a sub.
jective element if it is not to offend against common notions of fair-
ness, it is by no means widely agreed what this subjective element is.
The answer of the common law, as was noted earlier, is that it is a
mens rea or 'guilty mind'. But exactly what is a guilty mind? How
intimately connected must an individual's mind be with some mis-
conduct he has engaged in or some harmful result he has brought
about in order that he be justly held liable in the criminal law for
that misconduct or harm?" There are, of course, clear cases at both
ends of the spectrum. If a sane man in ordinary circumstances de-
liberately acts in a way he knows to be illegal, he has acted with mens
rea. On this point there can be no dispute; if mens rea means anything,
it means this. At the opposite end of things, if a man is held liable for
bringing about some result which, at the time, neither he nor any rea-
sonable man could possibly have foreseen, this is a case of strict lia-
bility. And then there are the 'middle' cases. In particular there is
one middle case, that of negligence, which has proved inordinately
troublesome to legal theorists. Indeed, much of the jurisprudential dis-
cussion of the general problem of criminal responsibility in the last
twenty years has centered on the seemingly narrow question of whether
negligence is a form of mens rea or whether to admit negligence as a
basis of liability in the criminal law amounts to strict liability."' Con-
10. 0. IV. HOLMES, TlE COMMON LAW 7 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
11. This formulation of the 'question of responsibility' is adequate for nearly all kinds
of crimes. There are certain aberrant cases, however, for which it will not do, e.g., crimes
of vicarious liability or certain crimes of status where liability for the offense is not
predicated upon any conduct the accused engaged in (see R. v. Larsonneur, 149 LT.R.
(n.s.) 542 (1933). These cases are expressly excluded from consideration here.
12. See, e.g., HALL Ch. 4; Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded Froth Penal
Liability, 63 COLUM. L. RIv. 632 (1963); HART Ch. 6; Turner, The Mental Element it
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sideration of this question has led theorists not only to the formulation
of precise standards of responsibility for the criminal law, but also,
concomitantly, to the formulation of quite general theories as to the
nature of criminal guilt, i.e., of that subjective element which, under
ordinary notions of fairness, makes punishment tolerable. The reason
for this seems obvious. As with so many other problems in the law,
theorizing is unnecessary when only clear cases must be dealt with. It
is when the limiting case arises that careful analysis of a doctrinal
character becomes indispensable.
One of the most ingenious theoretical accounts of the concept of
criminal guilt put forward in recent years is that advanced by Professor
H. L. A. Hart in a now celebrated essay entitled Negligence, Mens Rea
and Criminal Responsibility.3 Hart's essay has been enormously in-
fluential, and deservedly so. 14 Like many of his other works, it is a
kind of paradigm of lucidity and elegance in jurisprudential writing.
Whether the account of criminal guilt it contains is in all respects
satisfactory is, of course, another matter, and one which will be given
extensive consideration here. Before turning to this question, how-
ever, it may be wise to make a few brief remarks concerning the nature
of negligence and its role in the criminal law.
II. Negligence in the Criminal Law
The term 'negligence', as it is used in the criminal law, has a dual
reference. It refers (i) to certain forms of outward conduct and (ii) to
a kind or species of mental 'culpability' (to adopt the Model Penal
Code's formulation).15 These two senses of 'negligence', although re-
lated in certain contexts, are in principle quite different and should
be kept apart. Negligence in the first sense denotes "conduct which
is deemed by the law to be unreasonably dangerous," that is, conduct
which is unreasonably likely to cause harm.' 0 The criterion used by
the law in making this determination is the standard of safe conduct
observed by the 'reasonable man' or, as it is sometimes put, by the
Crimes at Common Law, in THE MODERN APPROACI TO CRi.iNAL LAW (L. Radzinowicz &
JAV.C. Turner eds. 1945); and especially Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence:
A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 401 (1971).
13. HART Ch. 6.
14. See, e.g., Sn.TrrH & HOGAN 57; CROSS & Jo.Es 43, and especially P. Brr, AN IN-
QUiRY INTO CaImiNAL GUiLT 99-100 (1963) and Fletcher, supra note 12, at 415.26. Thus
far Hart's approach to negligence has not been followed in any case, but ef. R. v. Hudson,
[1965] 1 All E.R. 721 (C.C.A.n
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
16. Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and Indifference; The Relation of Mental
States to Negligence, 39 HAgv. L. Rav. 849, 852 (1926).
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"man of ordinary prudence, acting prudently." This criterion is fre-
quently termed the 'negligence standard'."
The negligence standard is most often made use of in the criminal
law in connection with offenses which involve, by their terms, the
infliction of injury by one person upon another."' The most dramatic
example of this is the crime of manslaughter in English law. Man-
slaughter, of course, requires the death of another person. But it is
not every act which gives rise to the death of another person that
amounts to manslaughter. The act must be, considering all the cir-
cumstances, an unreasonable one, a negligent act. It must involve a
departure from the standard ot safe conduct which a reasonable man
would observe. Moreover, because of the seriousness of this offense,
the British courts have demanded that this departure be a wide one.
Only gross negligence or negligence of a "very high degree" will sus-
tain a conviction for manslaughter. 1 The degree to which an action
is negligent depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. Thus,
to cite a famous illustration, if a workman repairing a roof flings down
a heavy stone into the street and kills a man, this may be either mis-
adventure (non-culpable accidental homicide) or manslaughter. "If
it were in a country village, where few passengers are, and he calls
out to all people to have a care, it is misadventure only; but if it were
in London, or other populous town, where people are continually
passing, it is manslaughter, though he gives loud warning .... ..
The circumstances in each case determine the degree to which the
action departs from the standard of reasonable safety, and hence
whether it is sufficiently negligent to constitute manslaughter.
By using the negligence standard to define offenses such as man-
slaughter, the criminal law places upon the individual a kind of sub-
sidiary duty to avoid dangerous conduct. The duty is subsidiary in
both the sense (i) that it exists solely in virtue of the existence of a
primary duty (e.g., in manslaughter, not to cause the death of another
person) and in the sense (ii) that its violation is punishable only
when the harm prohibited by the primary duty results. This sub-
17. Conduct which conforms to the 'negligence standard' is commonly referred to as
'due care', this expression meaning only reasonably safe conduct. The expression 'due
care', in this use, does not describe a mental state or mental condition of any kind.
See id. at 852.
18. There are exceptions to this rule. The English offense of 'driving without due
care and attention' (Road Traffic Act 1960, § 2(1)), commonly known as 'careless driving',
may be committed although no injury is actually inflicted. See S,&tmT & HOAN 332.
19. See id. at 222-26; CRoss 8& JONES 152. The leading cases on this point are It. v.
Bateman, [1925] All E.R. 45 (C.C.A.) and Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
[1937] A.C. 576.
20. 4 W. BLACKsTONE, COMMENTARIES *192.
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sidiary duty is sometimes expressed as the duty to take reasonable pre-
cautions against harm, and for the vast majority of cases this formula-
tion is perfectly adequate. Thus, to return for a moment to the illus-
tration set out above, if a workman flings down a heavy stone into the
street of a country village, where there are "few passengers," his con-
duct is not unreasonable if he first takes the precaution of shouting
out a warning-or at least his conduct is not so unreasonable as to
constitute criminal negligence, i.e., negligence sufficiently gross to
ground a conviction for manslaughter. On the other hand, if he is
working in the city, the duty to take reasonable precautions against
harm requires more of him than this. It may require, for example,
that he close off the section of street beneath his work place or post
danger warnings or both. The subsidiary duty to take reasonable pre-
cautions against harm is thus a variable duty. It serves, however, in all
cases, to set a minimum standard of safe conduct below which the in-
dividual may not fall. This standard is, moreover, an 'external' one in
two distinct senses. Firstly, it is external in the sense that it is not fixed
by reference to the individual capacities or characteristics of the actor,
but by reference to those of a (hypothetical) normal or reasonable
man.2- Secondly, the standard is external in the sense that what it
evaluates is outward conduct alone, and not any mental state or mental
process.22 It is solely in respect of his actions that the individual com-
plies with or falls below the standard, although, as will be seen pres-
ently, a failure to comply with the standard will often-but not always
-constitute grounds for inferring some mental shortcoming on the
actor's part.
It was noted at the outset of this section that the term 'negligence',
as it is used in the criminal law, refers not only to certain forms of
dangerous conduct, but also to a kind or species of 'mental culpability'.
And it is 'negligence' in this second sense which must now be consid-
ered. Although negligence as a form of 'mental culpability' involves
matters quite different from those considered above (in connection
with negligence as 'unreasonably dangerous conduct'), it too may best
be explained by reference to the situation in which one individual
causes injury to another. When a man has broken the law, say by
bringing about some form of prohibited harm, he may have done so,
from the point of view of mental culpability, in one of three ways,
21. There may be some exceptions to this rule (at least in the cii law) if the actor
is sufficiently 'abnormal'. For example, in many jurisdictions a child is not held to the
.reasonable man' standard, but to one which takes account of his youth and inaxperiencc.
22. See Edgerton, supra note 16, at 852-59.
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viz. intentionally, recklessly, or negligently.2 3 A man acts (i) inten-
tionally with respect to some harm if he knows, to a practical certainty,
that his conduct will bring it about; (ii) recklessly, if he knows that
his conduct creates a substantial and unjustified risk of bringing it
about; and (iii) negligently, if he does not know of such a risk, but
an ordinary man of reasonable prudence would. Thus, it is often said
that intention consists in knowledge, recklessness in conscious risk
creation, and negligence in inadvertence amounting to fault.2'4 These
three species of mental culpability are not only mutually exclusive,
but also involve different degrees of blameworthiness. It is worse to
bring about some injury intentionally than recklessly, and worse to
bring it about recklessly than negligently. For this reason the law
often creates a number of different offenses, all of which prohibit
the same harm, but which vary in degree of seriousness. Thus, the
Model Penal Code recognizes three distinct forms of unlawful homi-
cide: murder (intention), manslaughter (recklessness), and negligent
homicide, each of which carries a different maximum sentence.
5
It is important at this point to note some of the characteristics of
negligence as a species of mental culpability. In the first place, unlike
both intention and recklessness, negligence does not involve any
awareness by the individual that he is doing something wrong. In-
deed, half the point of saying that an offense was committed negli-
gently is to exclude this possibility. That is why criminal law writers
sometimes use the expression 'inadvertent negligence' instead of simply
saying 'negligence'. It is not, hoi ever, the case that a man is guilty
of negligence every time he engages in some untoward act without
realizing what he is doing or what the consequences will be. It must
also be true that, under the circumstances, a man of ordinary intelli-
gence and reasonable prudence would have so realized. In other words,
an individual is guilty of negligence only when he fails to know some
fact or foresee some consequence of his conduct which a reasonable
man, similarly situated, would have known or foreseen. It is this fail-
ure which constitutes negligence as a species of mental culpability.
Negligence in this sense is, of course, related in certain contexts to
negligence in the sense of unreasonably dangerous conduct. When a
23. The Model Penal Code distinguishes two forms of 'intentional' wrongdoing:
(i) 'purposely' and (ii) 'knowingly' (corresponding to the older distinction between dirct
and oblique intention). MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1062). Both In
the Code and in practice, however, 'knowledge' and 'purpose' are treated as equivalent
bases of liability for most offenses. The major exception occurs in the law of attempts.
See id. § 5.01.
24. See, e.g., id. § 2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
25. Id. §§ 210.2 through 210.4 and § 6.06.
956
Vol. 81: 949, 1972
Negligence and Criminal Responsibility
man acts in a dangerous way, it is often because he does not know
some fact about the circumstances he is in or because he fails to realize
what his conduct will lead to. The two, however, are not the same. Nor
is it always possible to infer from the fact that a man has acted in a
dangerous manner that he did not know some fact about his sur-
roundings or did not realize what the likely result of his conduct
would be. It is unfortunately true that individuals sometimes inflict
harm on others intentionally or as the result of taking a calculated,
but unjustified, risk.
Finally, negligence as a species of mental culpability is not confined
in its use by the law to situations or offenses involving physical harm
or injury. Quite the contrary, unlike its behavioral analog, it has a
broad application across the spectrum of crimes. Every time an indi-
vidual's liability to punishment is predicated upon his failure to know
some fact which a reasonable man, similarly situated, would have
known or to foresee some consequence a reasonable man would have
foreseen or to make some judgment a reasonable man would have
made, he is held, in effect, for negligence, whether that term is used
or not. Such failures have been held sufficient, in varying circum-
stances, to ground liability for offenses as diverse as abduction, bigamy,
and non-repair of a highway.2 Indeed, although negligence may not
provide so wide a basis of criminal liability as Justice Holmes once
suggested,2 it is by no means an overstatement to say that it pene-
trates, in one way or another, nearly every corner of the criminal law.
Thus, the question of whether negligence constitutes a fair basis for
the imposition of criminal sanctions-or whether it amounts to a form
of strict liability-is one of quite general importance and implications.
Of course, this question is presented most dramatically in connection
with offenses such as manslaughter which involve gross forms of harm
and severe penalties. It is in this context of harm-doing that it will
be considered below.
26. See S TH & HoGAN 55 (abduction); id. at 485 (bigamy); and G. WIILLUAIS. CusINALt
LAW: THE GENEAL PART 115 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WNJtA%^ts] (non-repair
of a highway). In the case of abduction and bigamy, negligence is a sufficient basis of
liability as a result of the application of the 'reasonable mistake' rnle. which provides
that a mistake of fact-no matter how honest and sincere-will not excuse unless it is
also reasonable, i.e., unless it is of such a character that an ordinary 'reasonable man'
could also have made it. This rule, which qualifies the more general rile that a mistake
of fact simpliciter excuses, has been applied with increasing frequency in recent )ears.
This has been done for the most part, however, as an ameliorative measure to avoid
the imposition of strict liability in connection with offenses which involve the public
interest, but which differ in certain respects from 'public welfare offenses' in the classical
sense. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Gibb, [1967] 2 0.11. 243, and its sequel Warner v. Metropolitan
Police Commissioner, [1968] 2 All E.R. 356 (H.L.), especially at 367. Accord, Sweet i.
Parsley, [1969] 1 All E.R. 347 (H.L.). See also note 43 infra.
27. 0. IV. HOLMES, supra note 10, at Lec. II.
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III. H. L. A. Hart's Theory of Negligence and Criminal Guilt
According to H. L. A. Hart, there is nothing unjust, at least in or-
dinary circumstances where normal individuals are involved, in hold-
ing a person liable for some offense committed as the result of simple
inadvertent negligence. His argument in support of this proposition
proceeds as follows. It is a mistake to think that an individual is never
responsible for some harm he has brought about just because he did
not, at -the time he acted, foresee it as either a necessary or probable
consequence of his conduct. Foresight of consequences is not, as Turner
and others believe,28 a necessary condition of criminal guilt. Often
when a man has unintentionally caused injury, it is because he has
failed either before acting or while acting to examine the situation he
is in or to pay attention to what he is doing. It is these failures, when
sufficiently unreasonable, that the law makes punishable when it
adopts negligence as a subjective basis of liability. Surely there is a
world of difference between this and the punishment of individuals
who have brought about harm in situations where no exercise of rea-
sonable care and attention could have prevented it. When the law does
this, it imposes strict liability. But there is no reason to say that the
law also imposes strict liability every time it holds a person liable for
failing to think about what he is doing and attending to the dangers
he is creating. Of course there may be individuals who, for reasons of
mental deficiency, cannot exercise even the lowest degree of care over
their actions. To hold such individuals liable-in essence, for failing to
do what they cannot do-would be unjust and a reversion to strict
liability. But where a man has the normal capacities required to think
about his conduct and assess its risks, there is no good reason to excuse
him for not doing so when harm results.
To understand the argument that Hart is making, it is necessary to
see in detail both the analysis of negligence he is putting forward and
the standard of criminal responsibility or guilt he is invoking. Both
are of a highly original character. What makes harm caused by negli-
gence culpable, according to Hart, is not the fact that the individual
who brings it about does so without realizing what he is doing. It is
not, as it were, his mere inadvertence or 'blank' state of mind with
regard to the consequences of his conduct which makes him a fit sub-
ject for punishment. Rather, it is his failure to examine the situation
he is in before acting and to assess its risks while acting, and so getting
into this 'blank' state of mind.
28. See Turner, supra note 12.
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Here it is important to pause and note that if anything is 'blame-
worthy', it is not the 'state of mind' but the agent's failure to in-
form himself of the facts and so getting into this 'state of mind'.2 9
And later:
In ordinary English, and also in lawyers' English, when harm has
resulted from someone's negligence, if we say of that person that
he has acted negligently we are not thereby merely describing the
frame of mind in which he acted. ... [We are referring to the
fact that the agent failed to comply with a standard of conduct
with which any ordinary reasonable man could and would have
complied: a standard requiring him to take precautions against
harm.... Very often if we are to comply with a rule or standard
requiring us to take precautions against harm we must, before we
act, acquire certain information: we must examine or advert to
the situation and its possible dangers (e.g., see if the gun we are
playing with is loaded) and watch our bodily movements (handle
the gun carefully if it is loaded) .... [N]egligence does not . . .
consist in [a] blank state of mind but in our failure to take pre-
cautions against harm by examining the situation.30
What Hart is suggesting here is that the duty to take reasonable pre-
cautions against harm, which is present as a subsidiary duty in con-
nection with offenses such as manslaughter, extends not only to be-
havioral phenomena like 'shouting out a warning' or 'posting a danger
sign' (as in the workman example set out above), but also to certain
kinds of mental performances such as paying attention to what one
is doing or adverting to the situation one is in and its possible risks.
It is the individual's failure to perform these duties which results in
his 'blank' state of mind with regard to the consequences of his con-
duct, and also which grounds his liability to punishment when negli-
gence is a sufficient basis of liability in the criminal law. It is in respect
of this failure that the individual is at fault. Thus, what Hart has done
is to look 'behind' the negligent actor's inadvertence in order to find a
mental failure on his part which is capable of supporting a judgment
of culpability. This failure is the failure to exercise those of his mental
capacities (e.g., of observation, thought, judgment, etc.) whicl are
required to avoid causing harm. Of course, if the actor is a mentally
deficient person and lacks one or more of these essential capacities,
it would be unfair to subject him to penal liability since he could not
exercise the kind of caution and supervision over his bodily move-
29. HART 146.
30. Id. at 14748.
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ments which a normal person is capable of. On the other hand, if the
actor was, as is generally true, a normal person, there is no good reason
to excuse him from liability since he could have exercised the kind
of care the law requires, and avoided causing harm.
What lies behind this analysis, and provides its cutting edge, is a
thoroughly unusual conception of the 'subjective element' which is
required for criminal responsibility. According to Hart, this element
does not consist in what is usually termed 'guilty intent', i.e., knowl-
edge of circumstances and foresight of consequences. These psycho-
logical factors may be important as aspects of responsibility, but they
are not in themselves essential. What is essential is that the individual,
at the time he acted, possessed the normal capacities, both mental and
physical, for conforming his conduct to the law's requirements. Strict
liability, according to Hart, results only when an individual is held to
a standard of performance which he is not capable of meeting. Thus,
the important question raised by the mens rea requirement of Anglo-
American law is not whether the individual knew what he was doing
at the time he acted, but whether he could have, by the use of his
faculties, acted otherwise, and avoided causing harm.
Excessive distrust of negligence and excessive confidence in the
respectability of "foresight of harm" or "having the thought of
harm in the mind" as a ground of responsibility have their roots
in a common misunderstanding. Both oversimplify the character
of the subjective element required in those whom we punish,
if it is to be morally tolerable, according to common notions of
justice, to punish them. The reason why, according to modern
ideas, strict liability is odious, and appears as a sacrifice of a valued
principle ... is not merely because it amounts, as it does, to pun-
ishing those who did not at the time of acting "have in their
minds" the elements of foresight or desire for muscular move-
ment. These psychological elements are not in themselves crucial
though they are important as aspects of responsibility. What is
crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when
they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing
what the law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and
a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities. Where these capaci-
ties and opportunities are absent ... the moral protest is that it
is morally wrong to punish because "he could not have helped it"
or "he could not have done otherwise ....
31. Id. at 152. It should be noted that in the passage quoted above Professor Hart
appears to suggest that criminal responsibility requires not only that an offender have
had the capacity to conform his conduct to the law, but also that he have had a fair op.
portunity to do so. This is the only point in Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Respon.
sibility in which Hart makes this suggestion, and it is not clear what importance, if any,
he attaches to it.
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It is on the basis of this theory of criminal responsibility-what may
be termed the 'capacities model'-that Hart maintains that punishment
for negligence is not, at least in the vast majority of cases, where nor-
mal individuals are involved, a form of strict liability.32 It is important
to notice, however, that Hart is not advancing this theory solely to
deal with the problem of negligence. On the contrary, he obviously
intends it as a general account of the notion of criminal guilt and of
the claims of non-responsibility made by individuals under the doc-
trine of mens rea.33 Indeed, what makes Negligence, Mens Rea and
Criminal Responsibility so important an article in the literature of
jurisprudence is precisely the fact that it purports to resolve this basic
and perplexing issue.
Whether the unusual account of criminal guilt it presents is in all
respects adequate, however, is another question, and, surprisingly, one
which has received very little attention from criminal law theorists.
: 4
This is partly due, no doubt, to the highly abstract and elusive char-
acter of the issues involved. It is important to realize, however, that
in all inquiries of this sort there is a touchstone in reality against
which theory may be measured and evaluated. In the present case this
touchstone is the institution of the criminal law and the discourse of
moral claims which surrounds it. If Hart's thesis concerning the nature
of criminal guilt-that it is essentially a matter of capacities-is correct,
it should be capable of explaining at least the central practices of the
criminal law which bear on the question of guilt, as well as the claims
which surround these practices. In fact, as will be seen presently, there
are a number of features of the criminal law of this sort which the
'capacities model' simply cannot explain; and this suggests that the
model is, at least in certain respects, deficient. What is necessary, if a
complete and satisfactory account of the notion of criminal guilt is to
be achieved, is a more complicated explanation than that offered by
Hart, an explanation centering on the notion of 'choice'. The precise
details of this explanation, as well as its implications for the problem
of negligence, will be presented in Section V of this Note.
32. For the influence of this view, see note 14 supra.
33. Although Professor Hart never avows this 'generality of purpose' expressly, it may
fairly be implied from a number of passages inl Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal
Responsibility. See, e.g., HART 139 (where Professor Hart discusses his reasons for dealing
at length with Dr. Turner's view regarding negligence) and 152. See also, id. at 227.30.
34. But see Fletcher, supra note 12; Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded
From Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. Rev. 632, 635 n.19 (1963); and Wasscrstrom, H.L.A.
Hart and the Doctrines of Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, 35 U. C111. L. REV. 92,
102-06 (1967).
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IV. A Critique of Hart's Theory of Criminal Guilt
If a theoretical account of the notion of criminal guilt is to be at
all persuasive, it must be capable of explaining at least the standard
cases of 'excuse' recognized by the law under the doctrine of mens rea.
There are, however, at least two mental excusing conditions of this
sort which cannot be explained in terms of the 'capacities model' ad-
vanced by Hart. The first of these is duress. Although Anglo-American
law is somewhat sparse on the question of duress, there is recent Eng-
lish authority indicating that it constitutes a complete defense to a
charge as serious as treason.35 Indeed, some American courts have gone
beyond this, indicating a willingness, under certain circumstances, to
accept duress as a defense even to a charge of murder.30 As a general
matter, in order to make out a successful plea of duress, a defendant
must show that he was ordered to commit a certain offense and that
he had reason to believe he would be killed or made to suffer serious
bodily injury if he failed to comply.37 (Lesser threats have been ac-
cepted on a number of occasions.)38 It is not necessary, however, to
show that at the time the defendant was incapable of refusing or that in
any way he was deprived of the capacity to order his conduct as the law
requires. 30 Moreover, it has been held that where no adequate threat of
death or bodily injury is present a defendant may not introduce evi-
dence of such incapacity (based on extreme weakness of will, shyness,
35. R. v. Purdy, 10 J. CRIM. L. (Eng.) 182 (1946); R. v. Steane, [1947] K.B. 997. See
also Srmrit & HOGAN 142-45 and WILLIAMS 752-53. Duress has long been recognized as a
defense to treason in American law. See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 313 U.S. 717,
736 (1952).
36. See Paris v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 82, 31 S.W. 855 (1895) and Jones V. State, 207 Ga.
379, 62 S.E.2d 187 (1950). Both cases are cited in HALL 439 n.95. in Sephakela v. R., I
J. CIlM. L. (Eng.) 723 (1954), the Privy Council appears to have assunmed that dtiress
would be a defense to a charge of ritual murder in Basutoland, but it was not necessary
to decide the point.
37. See HALL 438-39 and R. PERKINS, CRUINAL LAW 954 (2d cd. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as PERKINS].
38. See, e.g., Perrylnan v. State, 63 Ga. App. 819, 12 S.E.2d 388 (19-10), where the thieat
of a prison guard to a youthful inmate to "make it hard for you; . . I will slap you
down every time I see you" was held sufficient to constitute duress, although there was
no suggestion that serious bodily injury was ever contemplated. See also Coninionwealth
v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 148 S.V. 18 (1912) (threat of "great injury, to person, reputatiol
or property" held sufficient). Both cases stand for the proposition that where crimes less
serious than treason, burglary, arson, etc. are involved, threats of death or grievous bodily
injury are not necessary to establish duress. See P'ERKINS 954-55.
39. Jones v. State, 207 Ga. 379, 62 S.E.2d 187 (1950). Moreover, inl many cases of duiess
such a claim would be plainly untenable: for example, in a number of treason cases, the
defendant's criminal conduct took place over a period of years. It is difficult to believe
that anyone could be 'paralyzed by fear' for that length of time. Further, i number' of
duress cases involve threats of a relatively minor character, threats sufficient to intimni.
date perhaps, but hardly capable of depriving an individual of the ability to control his
conduct. See note 38 supra.
For an older authority supporting this view of duress, see A. EASr, A TRUAIISt OF riHE
PLEAS OF THE CROWx 70-71 (1806).
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etc.) under the rubric of duress.40 The question of capacity or inca-
pacity is simply not relevant to the issue of duress. The defense appears
to rest on a quite different consideration: namely, that because the de-
fendant was threatened with serious harm by another, he did not make
a free choice to break the law.
Another well-established defense of the criminal law which, at least
in its application to a wide range of offenses, makes no reference to the
issue of capacity is mistake of fact.4 ' Thus, for example, if an indi-
vidual takes or destroys the property of another in the honest, but
mistaken, belief that it is his own, he is entitled, as a general matter,
to be acquitted of theft or malicious destruction of property.42 It is no
part of defendant's case to show that he was incapable of avoiding the
mistake he made. It is enough that the mistake was an honest one,
and that defendant's actions would have been innocent had the facts
been as he believed them. Although serious inroads have been made
on this rule in other contexts by American courts, it still prevails in
the law of England, not only in connection with property offenses,
but also with regard to such crimes as assault, battery, and malicious
wounding. 43 It is possible, of course, to argue that this is merely a
display of generosity on the part of the law: that it might well and
properly hold an individual liable every time he has failed to exercise
his faculties to the fullest, and, as a result, brought about some form
of prohibited harm. This argument, however, does not seem altogether
persuasive. In the first place, many of the offenses which recognize
mistake of fact as a defense involve quite serious forms of harm;"4 and
in such circumstances the law is rarely generous. More importantly,
however, the argument appears to overlook the nature of the claim
which is made by the individual in cases of mistake. That claim does
not appear, at least on its face, to be one for mercy or generosity. On
the contrary, it would seem that what the individual is contending
in cases of mistake is that he is innocent: that because he acted under
40. Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 388, 82 N.E. 781 (1907) (threat of death held inadequate
because too remote in time from commission of offense (arson)).
41. See generally SrrnT & HoGAN 129-31; CRoss & JoNEs 84-87; and l'Enits 939-43.
42. See SMiH & HOGAN 371, 461-62.
43. See id. at 252 (assault), 254 (battery), 266-68 (malicious wounding) in connection
with material at 129. There are, of course, a nunber of offenses in Anglo-American law
which require that a mistake of fact not only be honest, but also reasonable in order to
excuse. The suggestion by some commentators that this represents the general or common
law rule, however, seems unwarranted. See Wilson v. Inyang. 
[1951] 2 K.l. 799, and the
opinion of Lord Reid in Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1958] 2 All ER.
356 (H.L.), especially at 367. See also note 26 supra.
44. E.g., arson (see P.RKi s 218-20); mayhem (see id. at 184-89); assault, battery and
malicious wounding (see note 43 supra). See also PERmNs 942 for additional crimes honor-
ing the 'honest mistake rule (perjury, forgery, receipt of stolen goods, etc.).
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a misapprehension and never chose to do anything wrong, he does
not deserve to be punished.
A similar claim is often made by individuals who have engaged in
some form of misconduct as the result of ignorance of the law. While
such an excuse has never been allowed by English and American
courts, 45 it has rarely been denied, at least in the last century and a
half, that this practice imposes a form of strict liability. 40 The rationale
underlying this judgment seems reasonably straightforward: when a
man has committed some offense as the result of ignorance of the
law, it cannot be said of him-except, of course, where the offense is
malum in se-that he chose to do something he knew to be wrong. It
has never been suggested that the 'excuse' of ignorance of the law
ought to apply only to cases where the accused, for one reason or
another, could not have known what the law required of him. Such a
small claim, tied to the notion of capacities, might have been admitted
by Anglo-American law long ago. The fact is, however, that the moral
protest which underlies the 'excuse' of ignorance of the law extends
to a far wider set of cases. It is for this reason that the law has refused,
on grounds of public policy, to accommodate it.
Thus far the arguments advanced in this section against the 'capaci-
ties model' have dealt exclusively with the nature of certain claims
of excuse commonly put forward in the criminal law. There is, how-
ever, another feature of the criminal law, impinging on the question
of guilt, which points up the inadequacy of this model. It was noted
earlier that the law frequently creates several offenses, all of which
prohibit the same harm, but which vary in degree of seriousness ac-
cording to the species of mental culpability involved. Thus, for ex-
ample, the Model Penal Code recognizes three distinct forms of un-
lawful homicide: murder (intention), manslaughter (recklessness),
and negligent homicide, each of which carries a different maximum
sentence.48 The reason for this is that each of these species of culpa-
bility involves a different degree of blameworthiness. If Hart's thesis
concerning the nature of criminal guilt-that it is essentially a matter
of capacities-is correct, however, this phenomenon is completely in-
explicable. Since, ex hypothesi, in each case the actor possessed the
same (normal) capacities, mental and physical, for avoiding harm,
45. See SMITH & HOGAN 48-50. But cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). For
a wide range of offenses, mistake of law, as distinguished from ignorance of law, is a valld
defense. See SMITH &, HOGAN 50-51.
"46. For some early theories attempting to justify the practice, see HALL 378.
47. See id. at 378-82.
48. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2, 210.3, 210.4, and § 6.06 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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and in each case the same harm was brought about through a failure
to exercise these capacities as the law requires, there is no ground for
distinguishing between cases. The actor's guilt, if guilt is a matter of
capacities, must be the same in all. 49 Yet the law has always insisted
that the intentional offender is more blameworthy, and hence justly
held liable to a harsher sentence, than the reckless offender. This fact
can be explained only if the 'capacities model' of criminal guilt is
abandoned, and a different model, centering on the notion of 'choice',
is adopted in its place. If this is done, it is immediately apparent why
the law regards intentional harm-doing as more culpable than reck-
less harm-doing. In the first case, the actor has chosen to bring about
harm while in the second he has chosen only to take a risk, albeit a
substantial and unjustified risk, of doing so. There is no reason to
excuse the reckless offender for what he has done, but it is clear, at
least on grounds of blameworthiness, why he should be subjected to
a less severe sentence than the intentional offender.
V. The 'Choice Model'
The theory of criminal guilt suggested above may now be presented
in more complete and exact form. The theory is that, in essence, crim-
inal guilt consists in the free choice of the individual to do something
he knows to be wrong. This formula embraces three distinct elements
which, taken together, constitute the core of the notion of mens rea
or 'guilty mind'. The elements are: (1) that the individual made a
choice to do something wrong, (2) that the choice was freely made
(i.e., made in the absence of certain forms of coercion), and (3) that
the individual knew or could appreciate the wrongness of what he
49. There is, moreover, a second problem of this general sort confronting Professor
Hart's theory. It often happens that an individual who sets out to commit a relativcly
minor offense will, because of some unforeseen circumstance, end up committing a crime
of a far more serious character. In such cases the law is always faced with a problem:
should the defendant be held only for the crime he intended to commit or should he be
held for the maximum harm actually inflicted, even though such harn was unintended
and genuinely unforeseeable at the time? Many times the law chooses the latter course.
under the theory of 'transferred malice'. (Thus, if A sets out to commit grievous, but not
lethal, bodily harm against B, and B dies as a result, A is guilty of murder.) Where a %ery
great disparity exists in the relative gravity of the two offenses, however, the law may
refuse to do this. Thus, if A sets out to commit a 'technical' batter), against B (say
'touching without consent') and has no desire to injure B in any %%ay, but B dies as a
result, A cannot be convicted of murder or any other forn of unlawful homicide. The law
simply refuses to 'transfer malice' under these circumstances, on grounds that such action
would be unfair. This phenomenon, straightforward as it may seem, is completely inex-
plicable under Professor Hart's theory. Assuming that the defendant had the capacity to
avoid the underlying offense, there can be no reason for excusing him from all that
resulted. The test of 'capacities model' is simply met, and there is nothing more to be said.
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chose to do. Each of these elements exhibits a central feature of the
concept of mens rea. Moreover, each element is discrete and necessary:
none is subject to analysis in terms of some simpler or more compre-
hensive principle, and none may be dispensed with if a complete
account of the notion of criminal guilt is to be achieved. Finally, each
element must be present in any individual case of wrongdoing if mens
rea is to exist. Thus, if an individual has broken the law, but can put
forward an excuse (e.g., mistake, duress, insanity, etc.) which negatives
one of the elements set out above, he has acted without mens rea. And,
conversely, if he can put forward no such excuse, he must be deemed
to have acted with mens rea.
Each of the excuses referred to above represents a kind of 'defect'
which may accompany the commission of a criminal act. These de-
fects fall, broadly speaking, into two categories: (i) defects of volun-
tariness and (ii) defects of knowledge. Thus, it is sometimes said that
the concept of mens rea has two distinct aspects, a voluntariness aspect
and a cognitive aspect. From this point of view, each of the three
elements set out above may be seen as establishing certain require-
ments (of voluntariness or knowledge or both) necessary for 'guilty
mind', and it is only when these requirements are met-that is, when
no defects or excusing conditions accompany the criminal act-that a
mens rea is to be found. Although this is a useful way of viewing the
problem, it is important to realize that the three elements do more
,than merely mirror or summarize the standard cases of excuse rec-
ognized by the criminal law. In addition, and more importantly,
they provide a rationale for these excusing conditions. It is because
a particular mental condition (e.g., mistake, duress, insanity, etc.)
negatives one of the elements that it counts as an excuse. Thus, the
three elements constitute a kind of model (the 'choice model') for
explaining why the law honors a variety of different claims all of
which bear directly on the question of guilt. These matters may be
clearer, however, if each element is analyzed in terms of the specific
cases of excuse or defect to which it relates.
A. The First Element of Mens Rea
The first element of mens rea-that the individual made a choice
to do something wrong-is designed to account for both certain de-
fects of voluntariness and certain defects of knowledge which may
accompany the commission of a criminal act. The clearest example
of a defect of the first sort is presented by the phenomenon of 'invol-
untary action' or, as it is sometimes referred to by English courts,
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'automatism'. Cases of involuntary action are generally divided by
criminal law writers into two groups: (i) those in which the agent,
though conscious, was deprived of the capacity to control his bodily
movements (e.g., reflex, convulsion, etc.) and (ii) those in which
the agent was simply unconscious at the time of his offense (e.g.,
somnambulism, blackout, etc.).O Needless to say, in both sets of cases
the individual is relieved of all criminal liability.aI The reason for
this seems tolerably clear: in both sets of cases the agent's condition
precludes the imputing of a choice to him, and where the element
of choice is absent mens rea does not exist. In the first set of cases
choice is precluded by the fact that the individual was unable to con-
trol the movements of his limbs at the time the offense took place. In
the second set, it is precluded because the agent was unconscious, and
hence no mind or 'will' capable of exercising choice is to be found.
A second defect of voluntariness which serves to negative the ele-
ment of choice is 'irresistible impulse', a form of insanity widely rec-
ognized in the United States.5 Although the precise definition of
irresistible impulse varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the basic
requirements of this defense are in general the same. '' The accused
must show that he suffered from some disease or defect of the mind
which, at the time of his offense, deprived'him of the power to govern
his conduct and exercise the kind of self-control which normal people
are capable of. In short, the accused must show that he had substan-
tially lost the power to determine the course of his actions; that the
balance of his mind was so disturbed that he was incapable of exer-
cising choice, in any normal sense of the word.34 It is the loss of this.
power of choice which precludes a finding of mens rea.
50. See generally HART Ch. 4. Unconscious involuntary action Inay include acts per-
formed during natural sleep. See Boshears, (1961) The Tites, February 18.
51. This may be so even where the offense charged is one of strict liability. See Hill
v. Baxter, [1958] 1 Q.B. 277.
52. See generally A. GoLDsrEiN, TnlE INSANITY DEFKSE Ch. 5 (1967). Irresistible impulse
is expressly recognized as a form of insanity by the Model Penal Code. See MODEL l'ENAL
CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Although irresistible impulse is not treated
as a form of insanity under British law, the defense is granted limited recognition under
the rubric of 'diminished responsibility', and also in the law of infanticide. See SuNilt &
Hoc,.x 124 and 24041.
53. See GOsLDSIMN, supra note 52, at 69.
54. In the more florid language of the court in the celebrated case of Parsons v. State,
81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So. 854, 866 (1887), the accused must show that (although lie under-
stood the crininal character of his conduct), lie had "'so far lost the power to choose
between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, . . . that his free
agency was at the time destroyed .....".More contemporary statements of the rule do not
require complete destruction of 'free agency'. The Model Penal Code, for example, re-
quires only that the individual lacked "substanlial capacit' . . . to conforn his conduct
to the ... law." MODEL P'ENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Offcial Draft. 1962). The reason
for this is simply that such 'substantial' loss of control is sufficient to destroy 'choice in
the normal sense of the word, even though the individual Inay retain somle capacity to
govern his conduct. Compare this with Professor Hart's account.
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There is thus a point in common between the defense of irresistible
impulse and the two forms of involuntary action considered above:
in all three cases (viz., conscious involuntary action, unconscious in-
voluntary action, and irresistible impulse) it is the impossibility of
imputing a choice to the defendant which provides the moral basis
for his acquittal. It is important to notice, however, that these three
excusing conditions are in all other respects quite different from one
another. For example, it is generally not true in cases of irresistible
impulse that the agent suffers any impairment of his capacity for
muscular control, whereas this is always true in cases of conscious
involuntary action. Conversely, in cases of conscious involuntary ac-
tion, there is generally no loss by the agent of the capacity to mah
or form choices; the problem relates, rather, to the agent's physical
ability to execute his choices.5 And in cases of unconscious involun-
tary action, there is neither destruction of the power to make choices
nor of the power to execute them. The difficulty lies in the fact that
the agent is unconscious, and hence no mind or 'will'-at least of the
kind cognizable in moral theory-is present to which choices can be
imputed. The point here is an important one, although one frequently
overlooked by criminal law theorists: not all defects of voluntariness
are the same.O Nor are they necessarily even similar to any striking
degree. As a general matter they bear only one feature in common.
They all serve-each in its own way-to negative some essential element
of mens rea, and thus to preclude a judgment of criminal responsi-
bility. This matter will be considered again briefly later on in this
section in connection with the defense of duress.
It was noted earlier that the first element of mens rea-that the in-
dividual made a choice to do something wrong-provides an account
not only of certain defects of voluntariness commonly recognized in
the criminal law, but also of certain defects of knowledge. The two
clearest examples of this latter sort of defect are (i) mistake of fact
and (ii) failure to foresee consequences. Although the first of these
excusing conditions was discussed at length in Section IV, some of
what was said may be worth repeating here. When an individual has
55. For an excellent account of the different stages of action at which different excuses
come into play, see J. L. AusrIN, A Plea for Excuses, in COLLECrED l'A-'ERS 123 (1101).
56. For a classic example of this mistake, see Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500,
502 (Mass. 1844), where Chief Justice Shaw in explaining the defense of irresistible u.
pulse states the following: "If then it is proved ... that the mind of the accused was in a
diseased and unsound state, the question will be ... whether the prisoner, II conmnitting
the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse: If so, then the act
was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body, without the
concurrence of'a mind directing it" (emphasis added).
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broken the law as the result of a mistake of fact, he is, as a general
matter, relieved of all criminal liability-provided, of course, that his
actions would have been innocent had the facts been as lie believed
them. A defendant will gain no advantage by proving that he did not
intend to shoot Smith but rather Jones who looks just like him. Tile
rationale underlying this rule appears to rest on the following con-
sideration: when a man has broken the law solely as the result of an
innocent mistake, he cannot be said to have chosen to do something
wrong, and where no such choice is present, fmens -ea does not exist.
Precisely the same analysis may be applied to cases where the agent
was not laboring under any particular mistake of fact, but simply
failed to foresee what the consequences of his conduct would be; or
where because of a mistake of fact such foresight was lacking. In both
these cases, as in the case of mistake simpliciter, the defendant's claim
is essentially the same: that as he did not realize what he was doing
at the time he acted, and never chose to do anything wrong, he does
not deserve to be punished.
Moreover, a similar claim appears to underlie the defense of in-
sanity as defined by the first of the M'Naghten Rules. According to
that Rule, an accused is entitled to acquittal if, at the time of his
offense, he was suffering from "such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing ... .,,5 Disease of the mind is not, in itself, a defense to a crim-
inal charge under the M'Naghten Rules. The accused must show in
addition that such disease deprived him of the capacity to understand
the physical character of his acts, and it is this which constitutes the
specific ground of exculpation. Moreover, the judges in Ml',raghten's
Case also made clear that where the defendant did understand the
nature of his conduct, but acted under the influence of an 'insane
delusion' as to the circumstances he was in, he is entitled to acquittal
only if his actions would have been innocent had the facts been as lie
believed them.51 In short, an accused is entitled to acquittal under the
first of the M'Naghten Rules only in those cases where it is impos-
sible to impute a choice to do something wrong to him. The Rule
thus appears to be aimed at precisely the same consideration which
underlies the rule with respect to mistake. In both cases, it is the inno-
cence of the defendant's choices which precludes a finding of rons rea.
57. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (1843). The second of the M'Naghten Rules
is discussed later on in this section.
58. Id. at 211.
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B. The Second Element of Mens Rea
Thus far consideration has been given in this section solely to
those cases of excuse or defect which serve to negative the first element
of mens rea, that the individual made a choice to do something wrong.
There are, however, a number of cases in which it would be inappro-
priate to punish even though such a choice is present. And these cases
serve to point up additional requirements implicit in the concept of
'guilty mind'. One such requirement is embodied by the second ele-
ment of mens rea, that the individual's choice was freely made. This
requirement is designed to account for certain defects of voluntariness
which result from coercion. The leading (and perhaps only remain-
ing) example of such a defect in Anglo-American law is duress.
As was noted in Section IV, when an individual has broken the law
solely as the result of threats made against him, he is as a general mat-
ter entitled to acquittal. The reason for this seems tolerably clear:
where such circumstances exist, the individual's choice cannot be
deemed to have been freely made, and where no free choice is present
mens rea does not exist. The defect involved in cases of duress is, of
course, one of voluntariness. So much may be implied from the idea
of coercion. It is important to notice, however, that this defect is not
of the same kind as those considered earlier in the cases of involun-
tary action and irresistible impulse. In those latter cases, the gist of
defendant's excuse was that, because of some mental condition, he
could not be said to have chosen to do something wrong. This is gen-
erally not the case in duress since, except in those rare instances where
the individual is literally paralyzed by fear, there is no loss by the actor
of either the power to make or execute choices. Threats-unlike in-
voluntary muscular reactions and 'irresistible impulses'-are not inher-
ently destructive of choice."0 Rather, to speak accurately, they render
the individual's choice unfree in the sense that he has been compelled
by another person, in a position of dominance over him, to act against
his will.
It is this kind of compulsion to act 'against one's will' which lies at
the heart of the notion of coercion. And such a defect has long been
recognized as sufficient to negative mens rea. Indeed in earlier times,
at least one other form of coercion-apart from duress-was expressly
recognized as a defense in the criminal law. This was the defense of
'marital coercion', and although its precise scope was never fully de-
fined, there can be little doubt as to the problem with which it was
59. See p. 968 supra.
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meant to deal. At common law, a wife who committed an offense
in the presence of her husband was presumed to have acted under such
coercion as to entitle her to acquittal.0 0 No showing of threats or other
forms of physical duress was necessary since the kind of 'dominance'
involved was assumed to arise naturally from the marital relation.
The coercion was moral in character, but not without force. Indeed,
the sole means by which the prosecution might rebut the presumption
of marital coercion was to prove that the wife had taken an 'inde-
pendent part' in the commission of the offense.0' In other words, if
it could be clearly shown that the wife had not been made to act
'against her will', but had engaged in the crime voluntarily or 'on her
own initiative', then, and only then, was a judgment of mens rea
possible.
The particular social conditions which gave rise to the defense of
marital coercion have, of course, all but disappeared. The broader
principle underlying the defense, however, remains an integral part of
the concept of 'guilty mind'. Coercion-whatever its form-is no less
inconsistent with the idea of mens rea now than it was a century or
five centuries ago. This is, in substance, the point behind the defense
of duress, a defense which-despite the trend toward absolute liability
in modern criminal law-shows every sign of expansion. The defense
displays vitality exactly because the claim upon which it rests con-
tinues to possess moral force. It is, in the final analysis, the innocence
of those who have committed crimes under compulsion which shields
them from the sanctions of the law.
C. The Third Element of Mens Rea
It has been suggested thus far that the idea of mens rea embraces
two basic requirements: (1) that the individual made a choice to do
something wrong and (2) that the choice was freely made. There is,
however, one further requirement necessary to complete the picture,
and it is provided by the third element of mens rea: that the indi-
vidual knew or could appreciate the wrongness of what he chose to
do. This requirement is designed to account for certain defects of
knowledge which have long been recognized as excusing conditions
in the criminal law. Perhaps the clearest example of such a defect is
provided by the ancient defense of infancy.
At common law, a child beneath the age of seven was incapable
60. See SMITH & HOGAN 145-47; WILLIAMs 762-63; and PERi.%ats 909-18.
61. See W LuA Ms 763 and PmniNs 915.
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of committing a crime.0 2 The reason invariably given for this is that
a child of such tender years cannot know the difference between right
and wrong, and is, consequently, incapable of "contracting guilt".0u
In the somewhat stylized language of the common law, such a child
was said to be doli incapax or "incapable of mischief". A child beyond
the age of seven, but who had not yet reached fourteen, was similarly
presumed at common law to be doli incapax. The presumption was
rebuttable, but only upon a specific showing that the child had
achieved 'moral discretion', i.e., that he possessed at the time of the
offense a substantial ability to understand the moral character of his
actions.04 In short, unless it could be shown that the child knew or
could appreciate the wrongful character of what he had chosen to do,
a finding of mens rea was impossible.
Precisely the same principle at stake in the defense of infancy may
be seen as well in the defense of insanity as defined by the second of
the M'Naghten Rules. According to the Rules, an accused is entitled
to acquittal if, at the time of his offense, he was suffering from "such
a defect of reason, from disease of the'mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong."' ' It is not sufficient for re-
sponsibility under the M'Naghten Rules that the defendant knew or
understood the physical character of his conduct. Even if this were
true, the Rules define a second, and quite separate, ground of excuse:
that the defendant, by reason of mental disease, did not know that
what he was doing was wrong. Where such knowledge is absent, it is
immaterial that the accused knew or comprehended the physical na-
ture of his actions since it is clear that despite this he could not appre-
ciate the significance of what he had chosen to do. Thus, as in the case
of infancy, a judgment of mens rea is, by the nature of things, pre-
cluded. It has been suggested above, in Section IV, that a similar con-
sideration underlies the usually unacceptable 'excuse' of ignorance of
law.
This is the structure of the 'choice model' of criminal guilt. It con-
sists, as the reader will no doubt have already perceived, of three dis-
tinct elements each of which is designed to explain one or more of the
standard cases of excuse recognized by the criminal law under the
62. See SMITH & HOGAN 110; WILLIAMS 814; and PERKINS 837.
63. 4 W. BLACKsTONE, COMMENTARIES *23.
64. See SMITH & HOGAN 111-12 and PERKINS 839.
65. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (1843) (emphasis added). For an excellent
elucidation of the meaning of this requirement, see the opinion of Cardozo, J. in People
v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324 (1915), especially at 32940.
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doctrine of mens rea. As was noted at the outset of this section, these
excusing conditions divide, generally speaking, into two groups:
(i) those which relate to the voluntariness with which the defendant
acted, and (ii) those which relate to the state of the defendant's hnowl-
edge at the time he acted. As a consequence of this the 'choice model'
may be said to have, as an explanatory theory, two distinct components:
a voluntariness component and a cognitive component, corresponding
to the two principal aspects of the concept of mens rea. From this point
of view, the essence of the dispute between the 'choice model' and
the general theory of responsibility advanced by Professor Hart is
that Hart has, in the 'capacities model', eliminated altogether the cog-
nitive aspect of mens rea and also that part of the voluntariness aspect
of mens rea (represented by excuses such as coercion and duress) which
cannot be explained in terms of 'capacity' or 'incapacity'. For Pro-
fessor Hart, it will be remembered, actual knowledge of the nature
and consequences of one's actions and an actual choice to do something
wrong are not essential for 'guilty mind'. All that is essential is that
the individual have had at the time of his offense all those capacities,
both mental and physical, necessary for conforming his conduct to
the requirements of the law. It is only when an individual lacks some
such capacity-that is, when he is incapable of avoiding illegal conduct
-that he may claim to be without guilt. What this means is that, for
Hart, all excuses in the criminal law are essentially of one form: they
are claims of 'incapacity' of one sort or another. There are, of course,
a number of excusing conditions, well established in the criminal law,
which meet this form. These are excuses such as 'involuntary action
and 'irresistible impulse' which consist essentially in defects of volun-
tariness amounting to 'incapacity'. There are, however, a number of
excusing conditions, equally well established in the criminal law, which
do not. These are excuses such as 'mistake of fact' which do not relate
to voluntariness, but rather which imply certain requirements of
knowledge generally thought to be integral to the concept of 'guilty
mind'. To meet this problem what Hart has done is simply replaced
these requirements of actual knowledge by the general requirement
of 'capacity to know': so that if an individual could have known
that he was about to engage in some form of unlawful conduct-i.e.,
if he possessed all those capacities of observation, thought, etc., re-
quired for such knowledge-he must be deemed a fit subject for
liability. And the reason for this is simply that if the individual could
have known the nature of his offending conduct, he also could have
avoided it.
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Professor Hart's analysis is thus reductionist in character. For the
complex notion of 'choice', a notion which embraces elements of both
voluntariness and knowledge, Hart has substituted the simpler notion
of 'capacity' which is an important category (although only one of
several important categories) of the concept of voluntarincss. The
difficulty with this approach is that by reducing 'choice' to 'capacity
to avoid unlawful conduct', Hart has rendered himself incapable of
explaining a whole set of features of the criminal law which bear
directly on the question of guilt. And, of course, as has been shown
in Section IV, these features represent precisely those aspects of the
concept of mens rea which cannot be explained in terms of 'capacity'
or 'incapacity'. This general result is not altogether surprising. In-
deed it is the frequent fate of reductionist analyses: the explanatory
formula is so neat and simple that the author overlooks the fact that
it will not explain all that it is supposed to. But surely the principal
measure of a theory is its ability to explain. When a theory fails to
account for all the phenomena it is meant to, it is at best incomplete.
At worst it is inaccurate and misleading. This latter, unhappily, is the
case with Professor Hart's theory; for not only is the 'capacities model'
incapable of explaining a number of important features of the con-
cept of criminal guilt, but in attempting to do so it actually distorts
the principles and claims underlying these features. Thus, Professor
Hart makes it appear that all claims raised under the doctrine of mens
rea are essentially of one type, viz., claims of incapacity, when in fact
they are of a variety of types and aimed at a variety of principles all
quite distinct from one another.
Finally, it follows from the general analysis of this section that when
an individual has broken the law as the result of simple inadvertent
negligence he has acted without mens rea. This is so because it is ex-
actly in the case of 'negligence', as distinguished from 'intention' and
'recklessness', that there is no choice by the actor to do something
wrong. Indeed, half the point of saying that an offense was committed
through negligence is expressly to exclude this possibility. Thus, to
adopt negligence as a basis of liability in the criminal law is, neces-
sarily, to revert to a standard of strict liability and to eliminate that
'subjective element' which, under modern notions of justice, makes
punishment tolerable.
VI. Negligence, Mens Rea, and Ordinary Language
At the root of Professor Hart's views with regard to 'negligence' and
mens rea lie a number of considerations of a broadly theoretical char-
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acter concerning the subject of responsibility generally, and no treat-
ment of Hart's work in this area would be complete without providing
some account of these basic considerations. Professor Hart's position
with respect to 'negligence'-that it is, essentially, a form of 'guilty
mind'-derives at root from a philosophical analysis of the 'discourse
of excuses' which exists in ordinary language. The aim of this analysis
is to disclose, by an examination of excuses, and particularly of the
circumstances in which certain excuses are 'unacceptable', the stand-
ards of responsibility invoked in ordinary social life when one indi-
vidual has, by his outward conduct, caused some sort of harm or injury
to another. Thus, Hart begins his essay Negligcnce, Mcns Rea and
Criminal Responsibility with the following significant passage:
"I didn't mean to do it: I just didn't think." "But you should
have thought." Such an exchange, perhaps over the fragnents of
a broken vase destroyed by some careless action, is not uncommon;
and most people would think that, in ordinary circumstances,
such a rejection of "I didn't think" as an excuse is quite justified.
No doubt many of us have our moments of scepticism about...
the whole business of blaming and punishment; but if we are
going in for the business at all, it does not appear unduly harsh,
or a sign of archaic or unenlightened conceptions of responsibility,
to include gross, unthinking carelessness among the things for
which we blame and punish.0 6
The method of analysis employed by Hart in this passage was first
suggested by the late J. L. Austin,07 and the theory behind it may be
simply stated in the following terms. It is a characteristic of all, or
nearly all, excuses that under certain circumstances they will be 'un-
acceptable': that the claims they embody will be rejected. By exam-
ining these excuses as they exist in ordinary language and the cir-
cumstances in which they are commonly rejected, it is possible to
isolate and identify the standards of responsibility employed by ordi-
nary men in everyday social life. Thus, if "I didn't mean to do it: I
66. HART 136.
67. See Austin, supra note 55, at 142-43:
Standards of the unaccep~table. It is characteristic of excuses to be 'unacceptable':
given, I suppose, almost any excuse, there will be cases of such a kind or of such
gravity that 'we will not accept' it. It is interesting to detect the standards and codes
we thus invoke. The extent of the supervision we exercie over the execution of any"
act can never be quite unlimited, and usually is expected to fall within fairly definite
limits ('due care and attention') in the case of acts of some general kind, though of
course we set very different limits in different cases. We may plead that wve trod on
the snail inadvertently: but not on a baby-)ou ought to look where )ott arc putting
your great feet. Of course it was (really), if you like. inadvertence: but that word
constitutes a plea, which is not going io be allowed, because of standards. And if
you try it on, you will be subscribing to such dreadful standards that your last state
will be worse than your first (emphasis added in part).
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just didn't think" is not, under ordinary circumstances, an acceptable
excuse when harm has resulted from some thoughtless action, this
suggests that there is nothing inappropriate, at least under ordinary
conceptions of responsibility, in blaming a man and holding him ac-
countable for such harm. And, to complete the argument, if such
standards of responsibility prevail in the world of ordinary social
judgments, there appears to be no reason why they should not also
be applied in the law. "After all," as Hart points out somewhat later,
"a hundred times a day persons are blamed outside the law courts for
not being more careful, for being inattentive and not stopping to
think .... ,,08 Why then should these same negligent omissions, when
sufficiently gross, not provide a suitable basis for criminal liability?
Of course there may be individuals who, for reasons of mental de-
ficiency, cannot exercise even the lowest degree of care over their
actions, and it would be wrong to punish such individuals for their
shortcomings. But where a man possesses the normal capacities re-
quired to think about his conduct and the risks he is creating, and
fails to exercise these capacities, there is no good reason to excuse
him from liability when harm results.
It is this analysis which underlies Professor Hart's general position
with regard to criminal responsibility: that it consists essentially in a
failure to exercise those capacities of observation, thought and control
over conduct necessary to meet the law's requirements, and not essen-
tially in 'foresight of consequences' or an actual choice to do some-
thing wrong. But if this argument is correct, an anomalous situation
results since it seems reasonably clear from the analysis undertaken
in Section V that such a choice is an essential requirement of mens Tea
as that concept has been developed in the practices of the criminal
law. This anomaly may be dissolved, however, if one rather traditional
assumption of legal philosophy is abandoned: and that is that the
term 'responsibility' must have a single and uniform meaning, i.e.,
that whatever 'responsibility' means, and whatever 'subjective condi-
tions' it entails, it must mean the same thing and entail the same con-
ditions in all contexts and for all purposes. And, conversely, that
whatever amounts to strict liability in one context must also amount
to strict liability in every other. For this restrictive view however there
seems little justification, as the following modest observations may
make plain.
The practice of 'blaming', as it exists in ordinary life, is not a simple
68. HART 151.
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affair. Nor does it exist in isolation from other social practices con-
cerned with the appraisal of human conduct and, particularly, with
the making of judgments of responsibility with regard to such conduct
when it results in some form of harm or injury. These latter practices,
moreover, although intimately connected with 'blaming', do not end
in mere criticism. Rather they proceed to far more serious and tangible
consequences. One such practice is, of course, punishment. Another,
no less fundamental-and, perhaps, more familiar in ordinary life-
is the practice of making individuals pay compensation when they
have caused some kind of harm or injury to others. Both these prac-
tices are, of course, formalized in the law: the former in the criminal
law and the latter in the law of tort. Both, moreover, involve tie im-
position of liability on individuals for the harm they cause for the most
part on the basis of judgments of responsibility. And, as a conse-
quence of this, both may be said to involve 'blaming' of one sort or
another. Yet the standards of responsibility employed by each of these
practices-that is, the 'subjective conditions' required for a judgment
of responsibility in each-are quite different. In the criminal law, as
was noted in Section V, a judgment of mens rea or 'guilty mind' re-
quires, as a minimum, a finding that the defendant made a choice
to do something wrong. In the law of tort, on the other hand, the
base-line standard of responsibility or 'fault' is negligence, and this
requires only a finding that the defendant, whether intentionally or
not, engaged in some act which a reasonable man would not have
performed given all the circumstances. This basic difference in stand-
ards of responsibility between the criminal law and the law of tort
is, of course, a commonplace to most practicing lawyers; and few of
them would suggest, for example, that because the law of tort requires
only negligence for responsibility, and not a conscious choice by the
defendant to do something wrong, that it amounts essentially to a
system of strict liability. On the contrary, most of them would say
that where the issue in a case is compensation, as it is in all cases in
tort, negligence or simple 'fault' is enough for the proper imposition
of liability; but that where punishment is involved something more
than this-a conscious choice by the defendant-should be required.
The reason for this basic distinction is not very difficult to see: it
relates to the differences in purpose associated with the practice of
punishment, on the one hand, and the practice of enforced compensa-
tion on the other, and to the differences in the equitable claims in-
volved in each of these practices. When an accident has occurred, and
some form of harm or injury has been inflicted, someone must bear
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the loss. And, if the defendant was at all at fault-say, because he failed,
although not deliberately, to take some elementary precaution which
any reasonable man could and would have taken-there seems no rea-
son why he should not be made to compensate the plaintiff for the
harm done. In such cases the defendant is held essentially for his fail-
ure to exercise adequate caution, for not paying sufficient attention
to what he was doing and for failing to exercise those of his other
mental capacities (e.g., of observation, thought, etc.) necessary to
avoid causing injury to others. It is upon these 'failures' that the plain-
tiff's claim to reparation is based,'! and it is the principal purpose of
the law of tort to deal with such claims and to award compensation
when it is merited. The criminal law, on the other hand, has no such
function; nor is it concerned with claims of this sort. The sole pur-
pose of the practice of punishment, as it exists in the criminal law,
is to teach the offender a lesson and to deter him and others-by using
his misfortunes and disgrace as a public example-from engaging in
unlawful conduct in the future. This, of course, is strong stuff, and
most people would think that it requires for a justification, if it can
be justified at all, something more than the kind of 'fault' associated
with 'not paying sufficient attention to what one is doing' or 'not
stopping to think' or one of a hundred other inadvertent omissions
so common in ordinary experience. It is true, of course, that when
liability in tort is based upon 'fault' of this kind a deterrence mech-
anism similar to that which exists in punishment is also created, and
it may be admitted, at least arguendo, that an auxiliary purpose of the
'fault system' is to deter individuals from dangerous conduct by mak-
ing it both expensive and embarrassing. But even if this is so, it still
remains true that liability in tort, unlike criminal liability, is im-
posed only where and to the extent necessary to compensate a victim
for ihe injury he has suffered. Punishment, on the other hand, by its
very nature goes beyond this because it imposes liability even where
there is no injury to be compensated or when compensation has already
been made, and because it does this in all cases solely for the purpose
of 'teaching the offender a lesson' and 'making an example of him for
the benefit of others' so that the general 'system of threats' by which
society maintains order will not drop below an acceptable level of
efficacy. This is the meaning of penal liability, and the moral protest
involved when such liability is imposed for negligence is simply that
the defendant does not deserve to be subjected to this-that is, to the
69. This is not to suggest that there may not be other kinds of claims to compensation
properly recognized in the law of tort.
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added burdens of imprisonment or fine and the disgrace and stigma
which invariably accompany them-unless he has made a conscious
choice to do something he knew to be wrong.
This is a perfectly coherent and straightforward claim, and it is one
which the criminal law by and large respects. Indeed, it is this claim
which provides the moral foundation upon which the whole doctrine
of mens Tea rests. Nor is there any inconsistency in maintaining this
view, on the one hand, and acknowledging, on the other, that where
practices other than punishment are concerned, involving other pur-
poses and other claims, something less may be sufficient for an 'assign-
ment of blame' and for the proper imposition of liability. Indeed, to
take such a position is only to acknowledge that standards of respon-
sibility may vary from ond practice to another, and that what consti-
tutes an 'excuse' in one social context may not in another. And surely
this is not so very great a concession to make to the richness and com-
plexity of human social life. The ways in which an individual may
compromise himself morally are many and diverse; but it is only
when a man has brought upon himself the worst sort of blame, by
freely choosing to do something he knows to be wrong, that the suf-
fering and humiliation of punishment may in all conscience be applied.
